Staff were asked to report critical incidents associated with intravenous medications across a critical care network. These were categorised using a database by drug and drug class, seriousness and level of harm, process stage and communication factors. 139 critical incidents were identified in 3848 patient days. Noradrenaline, omeprazole, gentamicin and insulin were most commonly involved (range 6 to 9 incidents). Twenty two incidents involved drug supply, 61 prescriptions, 10 preparation and 58 administration.
Introduction
Critical and adverse incidents are frequently associated with intravenous drug administration in critical care 1, 2, 3, 4 . A large number of potentially toxic drugs are commonly used in combination and delivered to very ill patients, often using complex equipment. The process is then supervised by a large team of often-inexperienced staff who have to communicate complex information about the drugs, commonly under very stressful circumstances. It is therefore inevitable that patients may come to harm as a result of these processes 5 but it is also accepted that systems are not always in place to minimise these risks 6 . As part of a larger study of intravenous drug administration conducted by the Greater Manchester Critical Care Network, all staff were asked to report any critical incidents relating to intravenous medication.
Methods
A critical incident was defined as an incident reported by a member of staff where a patient or member of staff could have, or did suffer harm as a result of an intravenous medication.
Critical incident forms were placed in 16 Critical Care Units. Staff were asked to report critical incidents involving intravenous medications, documenting: date and time, patient's name and number, grade of staff involved, grade of incident (low, slight, moderate, major or life threatening) and a free text description of the nature and effect of the incident and how it could be avoided. Addition of the reporter's name was optional. The forms were posted in the unit's critical incident box; if one was not normally used a box was provided for the purpose. The study ran for 4 weeks on each unit with times staggered to start between February and April 2005.
The forms were collected, anonymised and analysed for common themes. As a result of this, a system was devised which classified the incident by: A) Drug and the drug's British National Formulary (BNF) classification. B) Stage in the medication process: supply, prescription, preparation, administration and monitoring or response to treatment. C) Whether a communication failure was involved and if this was around transfer to or from ICU or within the ICU stay and if this was verbal or written. D) seriousness of the incident and E) any actual harm caused.
An Access database (Microsoft Access, Microsoft inc. Seattle USA) was created that allowed entry of the critical incidents reported and subsequent completion of the classification system. The information reported, with patient identifiers removed, is held on one side of the input form, while the classification system is held on the other. The input form allows more that one classification for prescription and administration incidents; classifications can also be made in multiple stages of the medication process. The incidents were inserted into the database and were then classified by the members of the study group in open discussion. The completed database was then exported into SPSS (SPSS 11.4 for windows, SPSS Inc. Chicago USA) for subsequent analysis.
Results
A total of 139 critical incidents were reported from 13 critical care units with a median of 8 per unit (range 2-56). Assuming the network average occupancy rate of 95%, this represents 139 incidents in 2822 level 3 bed days and 1026 level 2 bed days.
In the 109 incidents where time was recorded, the number of incidents varied widely through out the day. The median incidents per hour were 4 (range 1-16), with 14 incidents occurring between 09.30 and 10.30 and 16 between 21.30 and 22.30. This may reflect the timing of regular drugs given by
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bolus administration. Problems with drug supply were also more common in the late evening. For all 139 incidents, 12 incidents involved more than one drug and 28 did not name the drug involved (for example reporting absence of a patient name band). The drugs most commonly involved were noradrenaline (9 incidents), omeprazole, gentamicin and insulin (6 incidents each), potassium chloride and heparin (5 incidents each). Incidents with noradrenaline were frequently attributable to problems with syringe labelling and identification. Omeprazole was commonly not prescribed when indicated and gentamicin was frequently associated with drug-level monitoring deficiencies. Insulin caused a range of problems including storage and identification; the most serious incident involved confusion between an insulin and a furosemide infusion where a bolus dose of insulin was inadvertently administered. Incidents of hypoglycaemia were recorded as part of a separate audit and are not included in these results, but a total of 28 of these incidents were identified, making this the most common adverse drug event recorded. When drugs were classified by BNF classifications the largest single group were drugs given to treat infection (33 episodes), followed by cardiovascular drugs (20 episodes) and drugs for nutrition and blood (13 episodes).
Sedative drugs used on the ICU fall into two categories -central nervous system (11 episodes) and anaesthetic drugs (11 episodes). Taken together these would have formed the second most common grouping of drugs. As regards the stages of medication, 22 incidents involved drug supply and 61 involved drug prescription. The most common prescribing incidents were 22 ambiguous prescriptions and 15 failures to rewrite drug cards. 10 incidents involved drug preparation, 58 involved drug administration and 6 involved the response to treatment and drug monitoring. The most common administration incidents involved delay in medication (11), syringe identification (10) and incorrect checking of the patient (10) . Sixteen incidents involved 2 stages in the medication process and one incident involved 3 stages. Twenty incidents were classed as major or life-threatening and 4 incidents resulted in temporary harm to patients or staff. One incident required intervention to sustain life.
Discussion
Staff were not requested to further classify the incidents directly as this would have resulted in a need for additional staff training, increased workload, increased the variability of the classification of the incidents and hence potentially reduced the number of forms submitted. Although classification was performed by the project team as a group, it would be possible for this to be done by one person if there was an independent check for consistency by second investigator.
Reviewing the incidents across a range of units suggested that some incidents, e.g. problems with drug prescribing, and with identification of syringe pumps, were common to most units, while others such as drug supply issues were specific to individual units. The drugs most commonly involved in incidents were different to those reported in similar studies from other countries 2,3 .
The burden of these critical incidents may be reduced by the use of electronic prescribing to minimise prescription incidents, while the provision of pre-filled syringes could prevent many of the administration incidents.
Other more easily achievable changes could be made to improve safety. The quality of prescribing could be improved if nurses were actively discouraged from administering drugs where the quality of prescription is unsafe, and if individual doctors were given regular feedback on the quality of their prescribing 7 . Several critical incidents were caused by the use of multiple drug charts. The use of more than one drug chart should be strongly discouraged and if unavoidable the charts should be physically joined.
Drug administration could also be made safer by ensuring clear labelling of syringes and infusion lines using agreed colour codes. Several UK manufacturers already produce specific labels for 50ml syringes and infusion lines. The care bundle approach requires units to conduct regular audits of standards of care on the ICU. Checking that all patients have correct identification bands and allergy alerts should form part of these audits.
Dosing intervals of more than 24 hours cause confusion. The start and finish times for infusions lasting for more than 24 hours should be clearly recorded, particularly for drugs like drotrecogin alfa where infusions are expected to last for 96 hours.
Repeated analysis of reported incidents should allow a continuous quality improvement approach 8 to reduce their occurrence. Comparison of incident rates and types between units may also identify how variations in patient care may produce different risks allowing best practice to be shared.
The database described in this study is freely available in the patient safety committee section of the ICS web site with instructions for its use 9 . Many countries are developing national reporting systems for critical incidents in intensive care 4, 10 and there are clear potential benefits to this approach. The central reporting of adverse incidents through the NHS reporting scheme should facilitate this in the UK, but is likely to take several years before tangible benefits occur in individual ICUs. Adoption of the described database would help in establishing a national ICU critical incident reporting system, which could rapidly be expanded if incidents going back several years were added. No additional work for clinical staff would be generated as they would continue to use existing systems, and the only costs involved would be in transcribing the information onto the database and in the classification and dissemination of results.
In summary, this system for recording and classifying critical incidents associated with intravenous medication is simple to use and could be used across different ICUs to allow identification of trends in incidents. We have identified some patterns in these incidents and offer suggestions as to how they could be reduced. The database and instructions are available on the ICS website.
